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Abstract
Bicooperative games generalize classical cooperative games in the sense that a
player is allowed to play in favor or against some aim, besides non participation.
Bicapacities are monotonic bicooperative games, they are useful in decision mak-
ing where underlying scales are of bipolar nature, i.e., they distinguish between
good/satisfactory values and bad/unsatisfactory ones. We propose here a more
general framework to represent such situations, called bipolar game. We study
the problem of finding the core of such games, i.e., the set of additive dominating
games.
Keywords: fuzzy measure, bicapacity, cooperative game, bipolar scale, core.
1 Introduction
Capacities (otherwise called fuzzy measures) and cooperative games are mathematically
close concepts, although applied and studied in separate fields. Despite this fact, a similar
generalization has appeared in both fields, called bicapacities on the one side [6], and
bicooperative games [1] on the other side. The aim is to describe situations where some
neutral level exist, surrounded by levels which are considered as bad, unsatisfactory or
harmful on one side, and good, satisfactory or benefic on the other side. As for example,
a player in a cooperative game can cooperate with other players to reach a given common
goal (benefic action), not participate (neutral position), or do some action against the
common goal (harmful action).
The first aim of the paper is to propose a general framework for this, called bipolar
games, taking into account recent generalizations of games and capacities, like multichoice
games, where each player can have different participation level, between full participation
and non participation. This framework is presented in Section 2.
A question of importance in game theory and decision making where capacities are
applied, is to find the set of additive capacities or games dominating a given capacity
or game. They represent, depending on the context, the set of rational imputations for
players, or the set of compatible probability measures. This set is called the core, and it
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may be empty. Necessary and sufficient conditions for nonemptiness are known, as well
as the structure of the core for convex games or capacities. A recent study by the authors
has been done for multichoice games, which is presented in Section 3. The second aim of
the paper is to investigate about the core of bipolar games. This is described in Section
4, the main section of the paper. A last section applies the general results to the case of
bicooperative games and bicapacities.
2 Bipolar games and capacities
Classical cooperative games on a finite set N of n players model situation where players
form coalitions S ⊆ N , and to each coalition S is attached a worth v(S) representing the
amount of money the coalition will get by itself (see, e.g. Owen [14]). Formally, a game
in characteristic function form or game for simplicity is a function v : 2N → R such that
v(∅) = 0.
The game is monotonic if whenever S ⊆ T , we have v(S) ≤ v(T ). A monotonic game
such that v(N) = 1 is called a capacity [2] or fuzzy measure [15].
In a classical game, a player can either participate to some coalition or not participate.
Multichoice games model situation where each player i ∈ N can have several totally
ordered levels of participation, labelled 0 (no participation), 1, 2, . . . li (full participation).
Coalitions are then replaced by participation profiles, indicating for each player his level
of participation [12]. Formally, we consider the product lattice L := L1 × · · · × Ln,
where Li := {0, 1, 2, . . . , li} is the linear lattice of participation levels, with the obvious
ordering. Then a multichoice game is a function v : L→ R, such that v(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0.
Multichoice games are particular cases of games on lattices, as presented in [5, 10], where
each player has at disposal a set of actions which is partially ordered.
A multichoice game is monotonic if x ≤ x′ implies v(x) ≤ v(x′), where x, x′ are
participation profiles in L, and ≤ is the coordinatewise order. Monotonic multichoice
games with l1 = l2 = . . . , ln = k are called k-ary capacities [7]. A multichoice game v is
additive if for any x ∈ L, v(x) =
∑
i∈N v(01, . . . , 0i−1, xi, 0i+1, . . . , 0n).
Ternary voting games of Felsenthal and Machover [4] and bicooperative games of
Bilbao [1, 13] present yet a different situation. In ternary voting games, voters can vote in
favor, against or abstain. While abstention is clearly a non participation, voting in favor
or against are forms of participation, leading to opposite consequences. Bicooperative
games are in a sense a generalization of ternary games, which consider that players can
play towards or against a given goal, or not participate. Those playing to reach the
goal are called defenders, while those playing against are called defeaters. Hence we deal
with bicoalitions (S, T ), where S is the defender coalition and T the defeater coalition.
Introducing the notation Q(N) := {(S, T ) ∈ 2N × 2N |S ∩ T = ∅}, bicooperative games
are functions v : Q(N)→ R such that v(∅, ∅) = 0.
A bicooperative game is monotonic if whenever S ⊆ S ′ or T ⊇ T ′, we have v(S, T ) ≤
v(S ′, T ′). Monotonic bicooperative games satisfying v(N, ∅) = 1 and v(∅, N) = −1
are called bicapacities [8, 9]. A specific section is devoted to bicooperative games and
bicapacities (Sec. 5).
We may propose a more general framework for bicooperative games, which we call
bipolar games. First we recall a few notions about lattices and ordered sets (see, e.g., [3]).
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A set L endowed with a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation ≤ is a lattice if
for every x, y ∈ L, a unique least upper bound (denoted x ∨ y) and a unique greatest
lower bound x∧y exist. The top element ⊤ (resp. bottom element ⊥) of L is the greatest
(resp. the least) element of L, and always exist when the lattice is finite. The lattice is
said to be linear or linearly ordered or totally ordered if ≤ is a total order on L. For any
element x ∈ L, the principal ideal of x is defined by ↓ x := {y ∈ L | y ≤ x}, and the
principal filter of x is ↑x := {y ∈ L | y ≥ x}.
A bipolar lattice (L,≤) is a lattice with top and bottom element ⊤,⊥, such that it ex-
ists a particular element 0 called the central element, with the property that
L = ↑0 ∪ ↓0, i.e., each element of L is either above or below the central element. We
denote for convenience L+ :=↑0 = {x ∈ L | x ≥ 0}, and L− :=↓0 = {x ∈ L | x ≤ 0}.
Let us consider (L1,≤1), . . . , (Ln,≤n) bipolar lattices with central points 01, . . . , 0n,
top and bottom elements ⊤1, . . . ,⊤n and ⊥1, . . . ,⊥n, and the lattice L := L1× · · ·×Ln,
endowed with the product order, i.e, x ≤ y if xi ≤i yi, for all i ∈ N , so that we have for
infimum and supremum:
x ∨ y := (x1 ∨ y1, . . . , xn ∨ yn)
x ∧ y := (x1 ∧ y1, . . . , xn ∧ yn).
Let us consider O := (01, . . . , 0n), and top and bottom of L which are ⊤ := (⊤1, . . . ,⊤n)
and ⊥ := (⊥1, . . . ,⊥n). Note that (L,≤) is no more a bipolar lattice since, e.g.,
(⊥1,⊤2,⊤3, . . . ,⊤n) is not comparable with O. Nevertheless, we still consider L
+ and
L−:
L+ :=↑O = L+1 × · · · × L
+
n
L− :=↓O = L−1 × · · · × L
−
n .
For any x ∈ L, x+ := x∨O and x− = x∧O denote the positive and negative parts of x,
elements of L+, L− respectively.
Definition 1 Let L be a product of bipolar lattices as above. A bipolar game is a function
v : L→ R, with v(O) = 0.
As for games on lattices, each Li represents the set of possible actions of player i. Players
choosing an action in the L+i part of Li (i.e., above 0i) are defenders, those choosing an
action in the L−i part are defeaters, while 0i indicates no participation. We denote by
G(L) the set of bipolar games on L.
In the sequel, we restrict to the case of linear bipolar lattices, that is, those of the form
Li := {−si, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , ti}, with a total order −si < · · · < −1 < 0 < 1 < · · · < ti.
Clearly, L+i = {0, 1, . . . , ti}, and L
−
i = {−si, . . . ,−1, 0}. We have ⊤ = (t1, . . . , tn),
⊥ = (−s1, . . . ,−sn). For convenience, we introduce the dual lattice of L
−, i.e. the set
−L− := {−x | x ∈ L−} endowed with the reverse order. Hence, its top and bottom
elements are (s1, . . . , sn) = −⊥ and O respectively. To any element x ∈ L
−, we make
correspond x′ ∈ −L− by x′i := xi + si for all i ∈ N , in short:
x′ := x−⊥, ∀x ≤ O. (1)
Hence, ⊥′ = O and O′ = −⊥. To any bipolar game v on L, we associate the multichoice
game v− on −L− by
v−(x′) := v(x)− v(⊥), ∀x ≤ O. (2)
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Similarly, the multichoice game v+ is the restriction of v to L+:
v+(x) := v(x), ∀x ≥ O. (3)
We may sometimes use the notation v = (v+, v−) to enhance the fact that v is a bipolar
game.
The particular case where si = ti = l for all i ∈ N is called a l-bipolar game. Clearly,
ternary voting games and bicooperative games are 1-bipolar games, with L1 = L2 = · · · =
Ln = {−1, 0, 1}.
To simplify the notations, we denote the element where the i-th player plays at the
k-th action level, the others doing nothing, by (ki, 0−i) or even k˜i. More generally, we use
the notation (ki, x−i), where xi ∈ L−i :=
∏
j 6=i Lj .
Remark that for any i ∈ N and xi, yi ≥ 0, (−si + xi) ∨ (−si + yi) = −si + (xi ∨ yi),
and the same holds with ∧ replacing ∨. Hence we get, for any x, y ∈ L+:
(⊥+ x) ∨ (⊥+ y) = ⊥+ (x ∨ y) (4)
(⊥+ x) ∧ (⊥+ y) = ⊥+ (x ∧ y), (5)
where + is defined coordinatewise.
Definition 2 Let v ∈ G(L).
(i) v is monotone if for x, y ∈ L, x ≤ y implies v(x) ≤ v(y). A bipolar game satisfying
monotonicity and such that v(⊤) = 1, v(⊥) = −1 is called a bipolar capacity.
(ii) v is convex if for all x, y ∈ L
v(x ∨ y) + v(x ∧ y) ≥ v(x) + v(y).
(iii) v is additive if for any x in L
v(x) = v(x+) + v(x−) = v+(x+) + v−((x−)′) + v(⊥)
and v+, v− are additive multichoice games. Equivalently:
v(x) =
∑
i∈N
v+(x˜+i ) +
∑
i∈N
v−((˜x−i )
′) + v(⊥), ∀x ∈ L.
We denote by A(L) the set of additive bipolar games on L.
3 The core and the Weber set of multichoice games
We recall in this section main results obtained by the authors for multichoice games [11].
In all this section, L := L1 × · · ·Ln, with Li := {0, 1, . . . , li} being linear lattices, and
A(L) is the set of additive multichoice games on L.
Definition 3 The precore of a multichoice game v on L is defined by
PC(v) := {φ ∈ A(L) | φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L, and φ(⊤) = v(⊤)}. (6)
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The precore, although convex, is unbounded. Indeed, considering a 2-choice game with
two players, hence L := {0, 1, 2}2, the conditions on φ to be element of the precore write:
φ(2, 0) + φ(0, 2) = v(2, 2)
φ(1, 0) ≥ v(1, 0)
φ(0, 1) ≥ v(0, 1)
φ(1, 0) + φ(0, 1) ≥ v(1, 1).
Remark that φ(1, 0) and φ(0, 1) may be taken arbitrarily large. We denote by PCF (v) :=
co(Ext(PC(v))) the polytope of PC(v), where Ext(·) is the set of extreme points (vertices)
of some convex set, and co(·) is the convex hull of some set.
Definition 4 The core of a multichoice game v on N is defined as:
C(v) := {φ ∈ A(L) | φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L,
and φ(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) = v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,max
j
lj}.
Remark that the core is a convex bounded set.
We introduce marginal worth vectors ψC as the vectors of increments along maximal
chains C in the lattice L. A maximal chain is a sequence x0 := ⊥ < x1 < · · · <
x
Pn
j=1 lj := ⊤ of elements of L, starting from ⊥ and reaching ⊤, such that for any i, there
is no element between xi and xi+1. Coordinates of ψC are denoted by ψCkj , for any player
j ∈ N and any level k > 0 in Lj . To any marginal vector is associated an additive game
φC defined by
φCkj :=
k∑
p=1
ψCpj . (7)
The important fact is that φ = v along the chain C. The set of all such additive games is
called PM(v), and the pre-Weber set PW(v) is defined as the convex hull of all additive
games in PM(v). Considering only restricted maximal chains in L, i.e., those passing
through all (k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,maxj lj , we define M(v), the set of all additive
games φC corresponding to marginal worth vectors associated to all restricted maximal
chains. Then the Weber set W is defined as the convex hull of all additive games in
M(v).
The following has been shown.
Proposition 1 Let v be a multichoice games on L. The following holds.
(i) PCF (v) ⊆ PW(v)
(ii) C(v) ⊆ W(v)
(iii) If v is convex, then C(v) =W(v)
(iv) If v is convex, then PCF (v) = PW(v).
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4 The core and the Weber set of bipolar games
4.1 Core and precore
From now on, L is again a product of bipolar lattices. We propose the following defini-
tions.
Definition 5 Let v be a bipolar game. The precore of v is given by:
PC(v) :=
{
φ ∈ A(L) | φ(⊤) = v(⊤), φ(⊥) = v(⊥),
φ(x) =
∑
i : xi>0
φ+(x˜i) +
∑
i : xi≤0
φ−(x˜′i) + φ(⊥) ≥ v(x), x ∈ L
}
As for multichoice games, it is not difficult to see that the precore is unbounded (see Sec.
3), so that we need to add other normalization conditions to keep it bounded.
Definition 6 Let s := max(s1, . . . , sn) and t := max(t1, . . . , tn). The core of a bipolar
game v is :
C(v) :=
{
φ ∈ PC(v) | φ+(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k) = v
+(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k), 1 ≤ k ≤ t
and φ−(s1 ∧ k, . . . , sn ∧ k) = v
−(s1 ∧ k, . . . , sn ∧ k), 1 ≤ k ≤ s
}
.
Hence, the core of a bipolar game is always a subset of the precore.
Note that the second set of equalities can be rewritten as:
φ(((−⊥)∧k)+⊥) = φ((s1∧k)−s1, . . . , (sn∧k)−sn) = v((s1∧k)−s1, . . . , (sn∧k)−sn), 1 ≤ k ≤ s,
taking into account the fact that v(⊥) = φ(⊤).
Proposition 2 For any bipolar game v, C(v) and PC(v) are convex sets, that is, ∀φ, φ′ ∈
PC(v), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], λφ+ (1− λ)φ′ ∈ PC(v), and similarly for C(v).
Proof: Let φ1, φ2 ∈ PC(v), λ ∈ [0, 1] and φ = λφ1 + (1− λ)φ2. Then
φ(x) = λφ1(x) + (1− λ)φ2(x) ≥ λv(x) + (1− λ)v(x) = v(x)
φ(⊤) = λφ1(⊤) + (1− λ)φ2(⊤) = λv(⊤) + (1− λ)v(⊤) = v(⊤)
φ(⊥) = λφ1(⊥) + (1− λ)φ2(⊥) = λv(⊥) + (1− λ)v(⊥) = v(⊥)
and φ(0) = 0. Since φ1, φ2 ∈ A(L), we have φ ∈ A(L). Thus φ ∈ PC(v).
Now, let φ1, φ2 ∈ C(v). For all 0 ≤ k ≤ s, λ ∈ [0, 1],
φ((s1 ∧ k)− s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k)− sn)
= λφ1((s1 ∧ k)− s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k)− sn) + (1− λ)φ2((s1 ∧ k)− s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k)− sn)
= λv(s1 ∧ k − s1, . . . , sn ∧ k − sn) + (1− λ)v(s1 ∧ k − s1, . . . , sn ∧ k − sn)
= v(s1 ∧ k − s1, . . . , sn ∧ k − sn), k = 1, . . . , s.
Similarly, φ(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k) = v(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k), k = 1, . . . , t. Since φ1, φ2 ∈ C(v) ⊆
PC(v), we deduce φ ∈ PC(v). Thus φ ∈ C(v). 
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Proposition 3 Let v be a bipolar game. Then φ = (φ+, φ−) ∈ PC(v) implies φ+ ∈
PC(v+) and φ− ∈ PC(v−), and similarly for C(v). Hence, PC(v) 6= ∅ ⇒ PC(v+),PC(v−) 6=
∅, and similarly for the core.
Be careful that in the above, PC(v+),PC(v−) are precores of multichoice games (see Def.
3).
Proof: Let φ = (φ+, φ−) ∈ PC(v). This implies that φ+, φ− are additive, and applying
(2):
φ(⊤) = φ+(⊤) = v(⊤) = v+(⊤) (8)
φ(⊥) = −φ−(−⊥) = v(⊥) = −v−(−⊥) (9)
φ(x) = φ+(x+) + φ−((x−)′) + φ(⊥) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L. (10)
Restricting (10) to L+ and L− respectively, we get:
φ(x) = φ+(x) ≥ v(x) = v+(x), ∀x ∈ L+ (11)
φ(x) = φ−(x′) + φ(⊥) ≥ v(x) = v−(x′) + v(⊥), ∀x ∈ L−. (12)
Let us show that φ+ ∈ PC(v+). We know already that φ+ is an additive multichoice
game. By (8) and (11), we deduce φ+(⊤) = v+(⊤) and φ+(x) ≥ v+(x) for all x ∈ L+.
Hence φ+ ∈ PC(v+). Similarly, φ− is an additive multichoice game, and by (9) and (12),
we deduce φ−(−⊥) = v−(−⊥) and φ−(x′) ≥ v−(x′) for all x ≤ O. Hence φ− ∈ PC(v−).
It remains to show the case of the core. Let φ = (φ+, φ−) ∈ C(v). Then
φ(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k) = v(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k), 1 ≤ k ≤ t (13)
φ((s1 ∧ k)− s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k)− sn) = v((s1 ∧ k)− s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k)− sn), 0 ≤ k ≤ s
(14)
Then clearly φ+(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k) = v
+(t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k), 1 ≤ k ≤ t, which proves
φ+ ∈ C(v+), and φ−(s1 ∧ k, . . . , sn ∧ k) = φ((s1 ∧ k) − s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k) − sn) − φ(⊥) =
v((s1∧k)− s1, . . . , (sn∧k)− sn)− v(⊥) = v
−(s1∧k, . . . , sn∧k), 0 ≤ k ≤ s, which proves
φ− ∈ C(v−). 
The converse is not true since choosing two multichoice games v+, v− does not de-
termine uniquely a bipolar game v, since v(x) is not determined for all x having both
positive and negative coordinates, and so can be taken arbitrarily large. The converse
becomes true if v is convex, as shown in Sec. 4.3.
4.2 Core and balancedness
Using concepts from linear programming, we give sufficient and necessary conditions of
nonemptiness of the precore and core of a bipolar game.
Definition 7 (i) A collection B of elements of L\{O} is prebalanced if it exist positive
coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, such that
∑
x : xi=ti
µ(x) = 1, ∀i ∈ N ,
∑
x : xi=−si
µ(x) = 1,
∀i ∈ N , and
∑
x : xi=k
µ(x) = 0, k = −si + 1, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , ti − 1, i ∈ N .
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(ii) A bipolar game v is prebalanced if for every prebalanced collection B of elements
of L \ {O} with coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, it holds
∑
x∈B
µ(x)v(x) ≤ v(⊤) + v(⊥)
Proposition 4 A bipolar game has a nonempty precore if and if only it is prebalanced.
Proof: Consider the following linear programming problem with variables φ+(k˜i), k =
1, . . . , ti, φ
−(k˜i), k = 1, . . . , si, i ∈ N :
minimize z =
∑
i∈N
φ+(t˜i)−
∑
i∈N
φ−(s˜i)
under
∑
xi>0
φ+(x˜i) +
∑
xi≤0
φ−(x˜′i)−
∑
i∈N
φ−(s˜i) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L.
Remarking that z = φ(⊤) + φ(O) + φ(⊥), and that the constraints write φ(x) ≥ v(x),
the precore is nonempty if and only if the optimal solution is such that:
z∗ ≤ v(⊤) + v(⊥).
Now, the dual problem is
maximize w =
∑
x∈L
µ(x)v(x)
under µ(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ L,∑
x
−i∈L−i
µ(ti, x−i) = 1, ∀i ∈ N
∑
x∈L : xi<0
µ(x) = 1, ∀i ∈ N
and
∑
x : xi=k
µ(x) = 0, k = −si + 1, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , ti − 1, ∀i ∈ N.
By the duality theorem, the dual problem has a solution iff the primal problem has a
solution, and in this case w∗ = z∗. Moreover, the two last sets of constraints imply
∑
x : xi=−si
µ(x) = 1, ∀i ∈ N,
hence the desired result. 
We define balancedness of bipolar game as follows.
Definition 8 (i) A collection B of elements of L \ {O} is balanced if it exist positive
coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, such that
∑
x : xi=ti
µ(x) = t− ti + 1,
∑
x : xi=−si
µ(x) = 1,∑
x : xi=ki
µ(x) = 1, for all i ∈ N , k = −si + 1, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , ti − 1.
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(ii) A bipolar game ν is balanced if for every balanced collection B of elements of L\{O}
with coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, it holds
∑
x∈B
µ(x)v(x) ≤
t∑
k=1
v(k ∧ t1, . . . , k ∧ tn) +
s−1∑
k=0
v((k ∧ s1)− s1, . . . , (k ∧ sn)− sn).
Proposition 5 A bipolar game has a nonempty core if and if only it is balanced.
Proof: Consider the following linear programming problem with variables φ+(k˜i), 1 ≤
k ≤ ti, and φ
−(k˜i), 1 ≤ k ≤ si, i ∈ N :
minimize z =
t∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
φ+(k˜ ∧ ti) +
s−1∑
k=0
∑
i∈N
φ−(k˜ ∧ si)− s
∑
i∈N
φ−(s˜i)
under
∑
xi>0
φ+(x˜i) +
∑
xi≤0
φ−(x˜′i)−
∑
i∈N
φ−(s˜i) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L.
Rewriting z in terms of φ leads to
z =
t∑
k=1
φ(k ∧ t1, . . . , k ∧ tn) +
s−1∑
k=0
φ((k ∧ s1)− s1, . . . , (k ∧ sn)− sn).
Remarking in addition that the constraints write φ(x) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ L, the core is
nonempty if and only if the optimal solution is such that
z∗ ≤
t∑
k=1
v(k ∧ t1, . . . , k ∧ tn) +
s−1∑
k=0
v((k ∧ s1)− s1, . . . , (k ∧ sn)− sn).
Now, observe that z can be rewritten as
z =
∑
i∈N
φ+(t˜i)(t− ti + 1) +
∑
i∈N
∑
1≤k<ti
φ+(k˜i)−
∑
i∈N
siφ
−(s˜i) +
∑
i∈N
∑
1≤k<si
φ−(k˜i)
Hence, the dual problem writes:
maximize w =
∑
x∈L
µ(x)v(x)
under µ(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ L,∑
x
−i∈L−i
µ(ti, x−i) = t− ti + 1 ∀i ∈ N
∑
x∈L : xi<0
µ(x) = si, ∀i ∈ N
∑
x∈L : xi=k
µ(x) = 1, k = −si + 1, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , ti − 1, i ∈ N.
By the duality theorem, the dual problem has a solution iff the primal problem has a
solution, and in this case w∗ = z∗. Moreover, the two last sets of constraints imply∑
x∈L : xi=−si
µ(x) = 1, ∀i ∈ N,
hence the desired result. 
9
4.3 Core and convexity
Proposition 6 If v is a convex bipolar game, then
(i) v−, v+ are convex games
(ii) PC(v+),PC(v−), C(v+), C(v−) 6= ∅
(iii) PC(v), C(v) 6= ∅. Moreover, PC(v) = {φ = (φ+, φ−) ∈ A(L) | φ+ ∈ PC(v+), φ− ∈
PC(v−)}, and similarly for C(v).
Proof:
(i) First we prove v+ is convex : If v is convex, v(x) + v(y) ≤ v(x ∨ y) + v(x ∧ y). If
x, y ≥ O, then x ∧ y, x∨ y ≥ O. Hence v+(x) + v+(y) ≤ v+(x ∨ y) + v+(x ∧ y), i.e.
v+ is convex.
Now we prove that v− is convex. For x, y ≤ O:
v−(x′) + v−(y′) = v(x)− v(⊥) + v(y)− v(⊥)
≤ v(x ∨ y) + v(x ∧ y)− 2v(⊥)
= v((x′ +⊥) ∨ (y′ +⊥)) + v((x′ +⊥) ∧ (y′ +⊥))− 2v(⊥)
= v((x′ ∨ y′) +⊥) + v((x′ ∧ y′) +⊥)− 2v(⊥) by (4) and (5)
= v−[((x′ ∨ y′) +⊥)′] + v−[((x′ ∧ y′) +⊥)′]
= v−(x′ ∨ y′) + v−(x′ ∧ y′).
Therefore v− is convex.
(ii) By (i), we know that v−, v+ are two multichoice convex games, then by Prop. 1,
PC(v+),PC(v−), C(v+), C(v−) 6= ∅.
(iii) First we prove that PC(v) = {(φ+, φ−) | φ+ ∈ PC(v+), φ− ∈ PC(v−)}. By Prop. 3,
it remains to show that any (φ+, φ−) is element of PC(v). Let φ+ ∈ PC(v+), φ− ∈
PC(v−) and put φ(x) := φ+(x+)+φ−(x−′)+v(⊥). Then φ(O) = φ+(O)+φ−(O′)+
v(⊥) = φ−(O′)+v(O)−v−(O′) = v(O) = 0, φ(⊤) = φ+(⊤)+φ−(O′)+v(⊥) = v(⊤)+
v(O)−v(⊥)+v(⊥) = v(⊤), φ(⊥) = φ+(O)+φ−(⊥′)+v(⊥) = φ−(O)+v(⊥) = v(⊥).
x
−
x
x
+
O
Since v is convex, v(x+) + v(x−) ≥ v(x) + v(O). Hence,
φ(x) = φ+(x+) + φ−(x−′) + v(⊥)
≥ v+(x+) + v−(x−′) + v(⊥)
= v(x+) + v(x−)
≥ v(x) + v(O)
= v(x)
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⇒ φ ∈ PC(v).
Now we prove C(v) 6= ∅ : If φ+ ∈ C(v+), φ− ∈ C(v−), then φ+, φ− satisfies also the
following properties : φ(k∧ t1, . . . , k∧ tn) = φ
+(k∧ t1, . . . , k∧ tn)+φ
−(O′)+v(⊥) =
v+(k ∧ t1, . . . , k ∧ tn) = v(k ∧ t1, . . . , k ∧ tn), ∀1 ≤ k ≤ t and φ((−⊥) ∧ k + ⊥) =
φ+(O)+φ−((−⊥)∧k)+v(⊥) = v−((−⊥)∧k)+v((−⊥)∧k+⊥)−v−((−⊥)∧k) =
v((−⊥) ∧ k +⊥), ∀0 ≤ k ≤ s. Hence φ ∈ C(v).

4.4 The core and the Weber set
As for multichoice games (see Sec. 3), we may introduce the marginal worth vector ψC
along a maximal chain C in L. Since eventually, only the corresponding additive game
φC is of interest, we consider only the latter.
Definition 9 Let C = {⊥ = x−
Pn
i=1 si, . . . , x−1, x0 = 0, x+1, . . . ,⊤ = x+
Pn
i=1 ti} a maxi-
mal chain of L from ⊥ to ⊤ passing through O. To C we make correspond the additive
bipolar game φ unambigously defined by φ(xi) = v(xi), i = −
∑n
i=1 si, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . ,
∑n
i=1 ti.
We denote by PM(v) the set of such additive bipolar games.
We set s := max(s1, . . . , sn) and t := max(t1, . . . , tn) as before.
Definition 10 A restricted maximal chain Cr is a maximal chain passing through all
points ((s1 ∧ k) − s1, . . . , (sn ∧ k) − sn), 0 ≤ k ≤ s, and (t1 ∧ k, . . . , tn ∧ k), 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
We denote by M(v) the set of additive bipolar games generated by all restricted maximal
chains.
Proposition 7 If v is convex, then
(i) PM(v) ⊆ PC(v)
(ii) M(v) ⊆ C(v)
Proof: Any maximal chain C passing through O can be decomposed into two maximal
chains C+, C− in L+,−L− respectively. Since v+, v− are convex by Prop. 6, C+, C−
generate two additive multichoice games φ+, φ− coinciding with v+, v−, which belong to
the precores of v+, v− respectively. Now, by Prop. 3, we know that (φ+, φ−) ∈ PC(v).
If C is a restricted chain, then C+, C− in L+,−L− are restricted chains too, and by
the same reasoning they generate an element of the core of v. 
We define the pre-Weber and Weber sets as follows.
Definition 11 The pre-Weber set of a bipolar game v, denoted by PW(v), is the convex
hull of PM(v), denoted by PW(v). The Weber set of v, denoted by W(v), is the convex
hull of M(v).
From Prop. 7 and the convexity of core and precore (Prop. 2), we deduce the following.
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Corollary 1 If v is a convex bipolar game, then PW(v) ⊆ PC(v) and W(v) ⊆ C(v).
Theorem 1 Let v be a convex bipolar game. Then
(i) PM(v) is the set of vertices of PC(v).
(ii) M(v) is the set of vertices of C(v).
Proof: Let φ ∈ C(v), then φ+ ∈ C(v+), φ− ∈ C(v−). Games φ+ and φ− are vertices of
the precore of v+ and v− if and only if φ is a vertice of the core of v. We know by Prop. 1
that the set PM of a convex multichoice game is the set of vertices of its precore. Thus,
PM(v) is the set of vertices of PC(v). The proof is similar for the core. 
The following result concerns the core and the bounded part of the precore, and
extends Th. 1 (i) (ii).
Theorem 2 Let v be a bipolar game. Then
(i) PCF (v) ⊆ PW(v)
(ii) C(v) ⊆ W(v).
Proof: By Prop. 1 (i) and (ii), we have PCF (v+) ⊆ PW(v+),PCF (v−) ⊆ PW(v−) and
C(v+) ⊆ W(v+), C(v−) ⊆ W(v−).
(i) Let us prove PCF (v) ⊆ PW(v). Let φ ∈ PCF (v), then φ+ ∈ PCF (v+) and
φ− ∈ PCF (v−). Hence φ+ ∈ PW(v+) and φ− ∈ PW(v−). Thus φ ∈ PW(v).
(ii) Works similarly for C(v) ⊆ W(v). 
We immediately deduce the following.
Corollary 2 Let v be a convex bipolar game, then
(i) if ∃i ∈ N s.t. si > 1 or ti > 1, then PC is unbounded, and PW(v) = PC
F (v);
(ii) W(v) = C(v).
4.5 A remark on additivity
For classical games, additivity appears as a special case of convexity. Namely, the ad-
ditivity condition writes v(A ∪ B) = v(A) + v(B) for any A, b such that A ∩ B = ∅,
while convexity is v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) − v(A ∩ B). Our definition of additivity in
Section 2 does not follow this line, but corresponds to the condition v(A) =
∑
i∈A v({i}),
equivalent to the above condition of additivity in the classical case. We show that for the
bipolar case, they are no more equivalent, and point out the reason.
12
Let us consider x, y ∈ L such that x ∧ y = ⊥. This amounts to x+ ∧ y+ = O, and
x− ∧ y− = ⊥, and consequently (x− ∧ y−)′ = (x−)′ ∧ (y−)′ = O. Let us assume that v is
a bipolar additive game as defined in Sec. 2, and verify if v(x ∨ y) = v(x) + v(y).
v(x ∨ y) = v+((x ∨ y)+) + v−(((x ∨ y)−)′) + v(⊥)
= v+(x+ ∨ y+) + v−((x−)′ ∨ (y−)′) + v(⊥)
= v+(x+) + v+(y+) + v−((x−)′) + v−((y−)′) + v(⊥)
= v(x) + v(y)− v(⊥).
Clearly, the two definitions are not equivalent. The reason is the normalization condition
v(O) = 0 = v+(O) + v−(O′) + v(⊥) = v+(O) + v−(−⊥) + v(⊥), which makes the term
v(⊥) necessary.
5 Application to bicooperative games and bicapaci-
ties
We shortly describe the case of bicooperative games and bicapacities, and apply the above
general results to this case.
As explained in the introduction, we use here the notation Q(N) for the set of bi-
coalitions. We define the order relation ⊑ on Q(N) by
(S, T ) ⊑ (S ′, T ′)⇔ S ⊆ S ′, T ⊇ T ′.
Doing so, (Q(N),⊑) is a lattice with supremum and infimum defined by:
(S, T ) ⊔ (S ′, T ′) := (S ∪ S ′, T ∩ T ′)
(S, T ) ⊓ (S ′, T ′) := (S ∩ S ′, T ∪ T ′).
(see [8]). (Q(N),⊑) is also a product of bipolar linear lattices {−1, 0, 1}, as already
mentionned in Sec. 2. A bicooperative game [1] is a function v : Q(N) → R such that
v(∅, ∅) = 0. A bicapacity [6] is a monotonic bicooperative game, i.e., v(S, T ) ≤ v(S ′, T ′)
whenever (S, T ) ⊑ (S ′, T ′), and such that v(N, ∅) = 1 and v(∅, N) = −1.
Using these specific notations, let us define convex and additive bicooperative games,
as well as subsequent notions.
• Eq. (1) rewrites as follows: for any (∅, T ) ∈ Q(N), (∅, T )′ = (N \ T, ∅). Hence,
v−(T, ∅) = v(∅, N \ T )− v(∅, N), and v−(N, ∅) = −v(∅, N). We could consider for
simplicity that v+, v− are classical games on N , dropping the ∅ argument. If v− is
additive, then v−(N \ T ) = −v(∅, N)− v−(T ).
• The above remarks permit to write: v is additive if v(S, T ) = v+(S) − v−(T ),
where v+, v− are two additive classical games, defined by v+(S) = v(S, ∅), and
v−(T ) = −v(∅, T ). Let us denote by A(Q(N)) the set of additive bicooperative
games.
• v is convex if v(S ∪ S ′, T ∩ T ′) + v(S ∩ S ′, T ∪ T ′) ≥ v(S, T ) + v(S ′, T ′).
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• The core of v is defined by
C(v) := {φ ∈ A(Q(N)) | φ(S, T ) ≥ v(S, T ), ∀(S, T ) ∈ Q(N),
φ+(N) = v(N, ∅), φ−(N) = −v(∅, N)}.
• A collection B of elements of Q(N)\ (∅, ∅) is balanced if it exist positive coefficients
µ(S, T ), (S, T ) ∈ B, such that
∑
S∋i µ(S, T ) = 1 for all i ∈ N , and
∑
T∋i µ(S, T ) = 1
for all i ∈ N .
• A bicooperative game v is balanced if for every balanced collection B of elements of
Q(N) \ (∅, ∅) with coefficients µ(S, T ), (S, T ) ∈ B, it holds
∑
(S,T )∈B
µ(S, T )v(S, T ) ≤ v(N, ∅) + v(∅, N).
• Let C be a maximal chain in Q(N), from (∅, N) to (N, ∅) and passing through
(∅, ∅). To C we associate the additive bicooperative game φC by:
φ+C(i) := v((S, T )
i+)− v(p((S, T )i+)), i ∈ N
φ−C(i) := v((S, T )
i−)− v(p((S, T )i−)), i ∈ N
where (S, T )i+ (resp. (S, T )i+) is the first element in C such that S ∋ i (resp.
T 6∋ i), and p(S, T ) is the element preceding (S, T ) in C. Then φC = v on C. The
set of all such additive games is denoted by M(v), and the Weber set W(v) is the
convex hull of M(v).
The definition of additivity coincides with the one given originally in [7] for bicapacities.
Note that the precore and core definitions collapse into a single one, since there is only
one level above and below 0.
The results shown in Section 4 all holds, with the above definitions. We summarize
them in the next proposition.
Proposition 8 Let v be a bicooperative game. The following holds.
(i) The core is a convex nonemptyset if and only if v is balanced.
(ii) If v is convex, the core is non empty and contains all additive bicooperative games
φ such that φ+, φ− are in the cores of v+, v− respectively and only these ones.
(iii) C(v) ⊆ W(v).
(iv) If v is convex, then C(v) =W(v).
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